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Abstract
This commentary analyses the implications of social media misinformation for global health risk 
communication. We define misinformation, describe the pathways through which it can adversely affect 
responses to risk communication efforts, highlight vulnerabilities in existing interventions and present an 
agenda for further research to understand and address this problem. 
Keywords: Communication; Outbreak; Risk; Misinformation; Social media.
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Resumo
Este artigo analisa as implicações da desinformação nas mídias sociais para a comunicação global de riscos 
à saúde. Definimos desinformação, descrevemos os caminhos pelos quais ela pode afetar negativamente as 
respostas aos esforços de comunicação de risco, destacamos as vulnerabilidades nas intervenções existentes 
e apresentamos uma agenda para futuras pesquisas para entender e abordar esse problema.
Palavras-chave: Comunicação; Surto epidêmico; Risco; Desinformação; Mídias sociais.
Resumen
Este artículo analiza las implicaciones de la desinformación en las redes sociales para la comunicación 
de riesgos de salud global. Definimos información errónea, describimos los caminos por los cuales puede 
afectar de manera adversa las respuestas a los esfuerzos de comunicación de riesgos, resaltamos las 
vulnerabilidades en las intervenciones existentes y presentamos una agenda para futuras investigaciones 
para comprender y abordar este problema.
Palabras clave: Comunicación; Brote epidémico; Riesgo; Desinformación; Medios de comunicación social.
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The rise of digital misinformation during outbreaks
As government officials in the southern Indian state of Kerala struggled to contain the 2018 outbreak of 
the bat-borne Nipah Virus (NiV), which eventually claimed 17 lives, a parallel outbreak of misinformation 
was spreading rapidly on social media, threatening to disrupt their efforts1. This included allegations that 
the outbreak was part of a corporate conspiracy to boost sales of mosquito repellent, specious claims that the 
virus is spread though eating chicken meat, and false reports of the virus having spread to unaffected areas. 
The government of Kerala released frequent press releases to counter the effects of this misinformation, 
which was causing confusion and alarm among an already panicked populace, and even arrested a group 
of young men behind one of these campaigns2. Beyond these corrective measures, however, public health 
agencies were unsure of how to stem the tide of misinformation campaigns, whose sources were often 
unclear and whose social vectors were beyond their control. 
The NiV case is only the most recent example of this phenomenon, which has also been referred to as 
a form of ‘digital pandemic’ or ‘misinfodemic’, in which social media channels like WhatsApp, Twitter and 
Facebook have been playing a major role3,4. This has become a growing source of concern within the global 
health risk communication over the past five years, having featured in outbreaks across South America, 
Africa and South Asia5.  Managing public responses to misinformation and developing interventions to 
limit its spread is thus a pressing global challenge, particularly given the growing penetration of social 
media low and middle income countries, where most outbreaks occur, coupled with the rising threat of 
infectious diseases in other parts of the world, where temperatures are rising due to global warming6. 
Misinformation, and how it spreads
The term ‘fake news’ has been popularised by current US president Donald Trump, however this is an unhelpful 
construct with mixed connotations.  Communication theorists often differentiate between “misinformation” - the 
presentation of information considered to be inaccurate by expert consensus7, which may be unintentionally 
misleading, and “disinformation” which is spread with the deliberate intention to mislead. For the purpose of 
this commentary, however, we follow Southwell, Thorson, and Sheble’s8 approach in seeing “disinformation as a 
special type of misinformation distinguished by the intent of the promoter”. Misinformation can therefore be used as an 
over-arching term to encompass false information mistakenly shared, as well as rumours, conspiracy theories 
and lies deliberately shared in order to confuse, divert, frighten or manipulate the recipient.  The sharing of 
misinformation comprises three key participants: ‘Senders’ who initiate the diffusion process, ‘Spreaders’ who 
forward such information and ‘Receivers’ who receive the information being diffused9. 
Infectious disease outbreaks provide an ideal context for the spread of misinformation. Often beginning 
as somewhat rare, mysterious, frightening or asymptomatic illnesses attributed to ‘foreign’ sources, news 
about infectious diseases is susceptible to rumour, embellishment and sensationalism.  Just as these diseases 
themselves spread through social networks, so does the digital information that now accompanies them, 
whether for positive purposes such as official health messaging10 or the negative purposes already described11. 
Infectious disease misinformation affects a range of actors, such as policymakers, health agencies, the news 
media, faith-based organizations and the general public, who may communicate both within and across 
groups during an outbreak12. In such a charged environment, the cultural, religious and political agendas 
of each of these actors may intertwine with widespread panic, confusion, and the need to make sense of the 
situation, giving rise to speculative theories and explanations. Not surprisingly, misinformation campaigns 
are often characterized by low levels of knowledge. For instance, one message circulating on social media 
during the 2018 yellow fever outbreak in Brazil claimed that the vaccine for yellow fever could kill13, while 
another suggested that the outbreak was the result of a political conspiracy by the Brazilian government14. 
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Having germinated, misinformation finds in social media an ideal vector that allows it to proliferate. Like 
infectious disease themselves, where a bacteria or virus spreads through physical networks, the structure of social 
media allows information to diffuse through online networks of individuals and groups connected on one or more 
platforms such as WhatsApp, Twitter or Facebook. Drawing on this analogy, scholars have analysed the spread 
of misinformation during Ebola using epidemiological modelling techniques and concluded that “the propagation 
of misinformation on Twitter can sometimes resemble that of genuine newsworthy events”15. This can prove particularly 
problematic as misinformation memes that circulate on social media often mask the identity of the original creator 
and could bear a striking resemblance to formal news stories. On encrypted platforms like WhatsApp, this means 
that users might often receive misinformation unsuspectingly shared by a family member or a friend, whom they 
are likely to trust. This relationship of trust can potentially lead message recipients to internalize the message, 
and even act upon it in a way that is health-harming. A case in point is two men in Nigeria who lost their lives 
after consuming copious amounts of salt water to protect themselves from Ebola, based on misinformation they 
received through social media16. In many ways these examples are not dissimilar to harmful folk myths, although 
with the internet and social media these may be spread rapidly and amplify at a global scale.
Social media platforms and smartphone capabilities can also empower users with tools to modify the 
original text, image, sound and video, to suit their preferences. These can exacerbate the problem by creating 
further opportunities for misinformation to be modified and spread virally in a way that can be hard to monitor 
or verify. Examples include taking and editing an image found in one source and recirculating it via social 
media, using algorithmic social bots to rapidly spread messages, and hiding the true source of the message via 
“astroturfing”17. These computer programs may exploit the ‘echo chamber ‘effect by distributing content that is 
tailored to users’ cognitive biases and information preferences, so that they are more likely to believe it18.
Considered at a population level, it is easy to see why social media misinformation could worsen prevailing 
levels of public anxiety and harbour false beliefs. Nearly half of the world’s population is now connected 
through social media platforms and use of these platforms is widespread in the global regions most susceptible 
to IDOs19. These regions combine unprecedented levels of smartphone penetration with low levels of health 
literacy and political tensions, making populations ever more susceptible to the influence of pseudo-normative 
beliefs. New evidence shows how fake news travels faster than the truth and reaches more people while so 
doing20. In such an environment, misinformation can seriously disrupt formal risk communication efforts 
that seek to allay public concern through disseminating scientifically valid and preventive information. 
How misinformation affects outbreak communication efforts
During public health crises such as IDOs, an immense and immediate need for crisis information and effective 
risk communication is created21. Consistent with the World Health Organization’s (WHO) recommendations22, 
public health agencies are expected to respond to this need by managing the communication environment 
during three stages: preparedness, response, and recovery. The ‘preparedness phase’ involves assessing the 
information needs of the public and cultivating relationships of trust with stakeholders who can be effective 
allies in the dissemination process, such as the news media, community and religious groups, and social 
influencers. The ‘response phase’, which is arguably the most challenging, arrives after an outbreak has 
been announced. Here, the focus is on leveraging the relationships built through preparedness activities to 
implement a communication strategy that involves reliable spokespersons, transparent updates of the situation, 
clear communication of uncertainty, and intelligible presentation of information. Effective communication 
strategies are those that are successfully able to contain public concern while sufficiently informing citizens 
about the threat, as well as influencing them to undertake preventive actions. Most public health agencies now 
employ social media tools with varying levels of reach and impact for public outreach and communication 
during IDOs. While the aim is to instil confidence through clear communications based on scientific evidence, 
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evolving levels of fear, anxiety, and panic will mean that the risk communication community must be equipped 
with tools and strategies that are sufficiently dynamic to respond to situations as they evolve. Efforts during the 
‘recovery phase’ are focused on reiterating messages to encourage personal protective behaviour and chronicle 
the lessons learned to inform the next round of the risk communication cycle. 
Misinformation specific to IDOs usually disrupts risk communication activities in the response phase, 
causing a cascade of casualties. The first of these is the intentional or unintentional challenge to scientific 
information being disseminated by public health authorities. Infused with doubt and confronted by even 
more uncertainty, individuals or communities exposed could react in a number of ways to the new burst 
of information that challenges their existing knowledge and understanding of the problem. Being exposed 
to misinformation early on in an outbreak may cause people to form and thereafter persist with opinions 
that differ substantially from those they would have had if they had been correctly informed23. The spread 
of (mis)information can thus shape perceptions of reality, with important consequences for choices about 
prevention or treatment24. These psychological effects can vary between demographic or psychological 
groups. In one study, for example, older adults with more education, liberal political views, and good 
analytical skills were better at discerning real news from “fake news”25. Personality may also play a role; 
for example, studies have observed that  extraverted individuals are more likely to share misinformation 
whereas those with high conscientiousness were less likely to do so26. 
In a public health emergency misinformation may complicate situational awareness of an incident, 
defined as the “ability to identify, process and comprehend critical elements of an incident or situation”27. Doubting the 
credibility of the information being disseminated by health agencies can also undermine their authority 
of public health officials, putting them at risk, thus making it more difficult for effective interventions to 
reach their intended recipients. A recent analysis of Youtube videos revealed how online misinformation 
has contributed to public hesitancy to be vaccinated in Italy27. In these ways, misinformation can disrupt 
a carefully choreographed health communication strategy on the part of official agencies tasked with 
managing the situation. Most critically, misinformation can create fissures in trust between communities 
and health agencies, widely acknowledged as the cornerstone of any risk communication programme. 
The dichotomy of corrective information
Public health agencies faced with the twin spread of infectious disease and social media misinformation 
face an uphill struggle. The novelty of this phenomenon means that few successful precedents, impact 
case studies, or guidelines are available to inform these strategies. Secondly, countering misinformation 
by disseminating corrective information is a double-edged sword. To investigate how misinformation can 
be refuted during a public health crisis, de Meer and Jin28 conducted an online experiment in the U.S. 
where they exposed participants to misinformation, followed by different types of corrective information 
(simple rebuttal vs. factual elaboration) supposedly from different sources (government health agency vs. 
news media vs. social peer). The corrective information helped to change participants’ beliefs based on 
previous misinformation, whilst exposure to factual elaborationi made them more likely to take protective 
actions. Messages sent from government agencies and news media sources were found to be successful in 
improving belief accuracy. However, other research has demonstrated that corrective messaging strategies 
can paradoxically reduce intention to undertake scientifically recommended behaviours like vaccine 
uptake and may even exacerbate beliefs in misinformation29,30. Biases involved in interpreting evidence 
and resistance to scientific information weaken the impact of corrective information on ameliorating 
misinformation beliefs29,31,32. Members of the Ebola Response Anthropology Platform critiqued the use of 
i Factual elaboration refers to elaborated factual detail of the corrective information that aims to refute factual error contained in 
the misinformation.
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corrective information during the 2014 Ebola outbreak explaining that messages driven purely by a clinical 
or epidemiological framing of the problem are unlikely to work unless they are sensitive to “the historical, 
political, economic and social contexts in which they are delivered”33. 
Gaps in health system responses to misinformation and opportunities for 
improvement 
While better uses of information from web searches, social media and participatory surveillance systems 
are helping global and local health agencies to better track and manage emerging outbreaks, handling 
the spread of misinformation represents an increasing and unwelcome burden, which risks lives, as the 
resurgence of measles in response to alarmist anti-vaccine campaigns is now demonstrating in parts of 
Europe34. In response, online volunteer groups and health agencies are using Facebook groups, Twitter and 
Instagram to counter misinformation and respond to public queries triggered by misinformation35. The 
US Centres for Disease Control offers guidelines to encounter misinformation and rumours on its website 
and provides specific strategies that health agencies can use while dealing with misinformation in the news 
media36,37. In addition to technological solutions, health authorities in countries like India are beginning to 
treat misinformation as a form of cybercrime and taking punitive action against offenders. During the NiV 
outbreak, the state government tracked and arrested 12 individuals on charges of forgery. These individuals 
had used their Facebook accounts to spread a warning masquerading as a state health department directive 
cautioning people against buying poultry products2. Other countries have introduced or considering new 
laws which specifically target the spreading of false information online; for example Malaysia has recently 
introduced a penalty of up to six years for doing so38. 
The abovementioned responses to tackling misinformation offer encouraging signs that responsible 
public health agencies are actively seeking to address this problem. However, in order to combat 
misinformation and lessen its impacts, health systems must develop mechanisms to keep pace with the rate 
of misinformation and the emergent technologies that are fuelling its rapid spread. The first step in that 
process is to acknowledge the limitations of traditional corrective messaging strategies and develop novel 
approaches to improving public understanding in the face of misinformation. 
A review commissioned by WHO found that tracking misinformation memes on social media platforms, 
and superseding them with accurate information bearing similar hashtags might be one useful approach39,40. 
Bode and Vraga23 recommend that health agencies disseminate corrective information through individual 
users as opposed to through algorithms, based on an experiment comparing the two approaches. These low 
hanging solutions need to be bolstered by a fundamental understanding of the structure of misinformation 
contagion in online spaces and the most effective mechanisms by which to impede its spread3. Evidence is 
not yet available to document public health agencies’ use of tools like Hoaxy and Botometer18 or commercial 
social listening platforms. Further work is required to articulate the institutional arrangements needed 
to facilitate such collaborations. A critical consideration is how to leverage new streams of expertise and 
resources in a manner that avoids placing even greater economic pressure on the public health establishment. 
In this respect, organised, crowd-sourcing approaches hold promise, much as these are helping to suppress 
other types of ‘fake news’ and toxic online practices. The scale of the problem demands global networks 
of appropriately trained misinformation ‘sentinels’, just as these are required for spotting and tracking 
outbreak indicators in context10. In addition to harnessing the ‘social machine’ for good, developing global 
agreements to classify and manage deliberately misleading and potentially harmful information under the 
framework of cybersecurity warrants further attention. 
While punitive measures, such as those seen in India, might help to curtail future behaviour, these 
approaches also provoke ethical dilemmas, such as how to balance the right to freedom of expression 
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and public safety; or ‘social listening’ to identify health misinformation versus protecting citizens’ 
privacy. The stakes are raised where such behaviour is criminalised, as can be seen in the debate 
over freedom of speech prompted by Facebook’s recent banning of Alex Jones, whose social media 
channel ‘Infowars’ has been used to divide and confuse the public about issues such as gun control 
and vaccination41.Getting the balance right is challenging in a global context, since governments’ can 
differ widely in their attitudes towards human rights raising the potential for social media monitoring 
‘in the public interest’ to be misused for political gain or control.
Given the twin threats of IDO and misinformation contagion, alongside the dilemmas described, it is 
incumbent upon the global public health community to come together to develop agreements, guidelines and 
strategies for tackling misinformation, appropriate and sophisticated methodologies for doing so, and ethico-
legal frameworks for using these approaches in the public interest. This will require high-level buy in, multi-
stakeholder involvement and interdisciplinary thinking. Innovations such as machine learning for recognising 
misinformation patterns)42, blockchain for verifying trustworthy sources43 and crowdsourced fact-checking44 also 
offer promising opportunities for further development.
Conclusions and recommendations
As the risk of infectious disease pandemics rises worldwide, the problem of social media misinformation 
is becoming ever more of a threat to global health and security. Recent outbreaks, where this obstructed 
public health communication efforts, offer the chance to study the dynamics and effects of digital contagion 
retrospectively, while the data sciences present opportunities for innovation in the real-time surveillance 
and control of outbreak misinformation. Without human collaboration and intervention at the national 
and global levels, however, such methods will only achieve so much. We urge public health agencies, 
health communication experts and governments to come together in an effort to develop agreements and 
guidelines to advance the scientific, practical and policy innovation necessary to tackle this problem. We 
also urge new efforts to better understand how citizens perceive and balance the need for public health 
protection and their rights to information access, free speech and privacy, to ensure that these innovations 
are both responsible and ethical.
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